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Is India Shining?  
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Abstract 
In India, the popular perception is economic reforms have benefited the rich more than 
the poor leading to an unequal income distribution, as in Quah’s twin peaks hypothesis. 
In this article we test this hypothesis by studying the spatial dynamics of income 
distribution. Using district-level per-capita income we find that the income distribution 
has not changed. The perception about economic reforms having benefitted only the rich 
is not correct because income growth across districts is positively correlated spatially. 
Thus there is a positive spatial multiplier effect on income and growth. In addition, we 
also identify physical infrastructure, human capital, and factories, as factors responsible 
for increase in income for both the rich, and the poor districts.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The present debate about India’s development strategy is inclusive growth. 
Inclusive growth emphasizes a more equitable distribution of income, and building 
capabilities for attaining better health and education. The general notion about the 
success of inclusive growth is pessimistic. The argument generally made is that the poor 
are getting richer, but the rich are getting richer faster.
 3
  
Apparently such an outcome is not surprising. Free market reforms entail unequal 
payoff to economic agents. People with better skill stand to gain more compared to 
people with lesser skill. The perception about economic reforms only benefitting the rich 
might have been one of the factors responsible for the ouster of the National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA) government; paving the way for United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
government initially during 2004, and subsequent re-election in 2009. To address this 
perception about increase in income inequality, the UPA government, started several 
market interventions. Schemes such as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is a classic example of a labor market intervention.
4
 Capital 
market intervention through microfinance also emerged substantially. However, the 
notion about the poor not benefitting from economic reforms still exists. 
How true is this perception? We answer this question by looking at the dynamics 
of income distributional pattern in India. If reforms are pro-rich then we would see the 
emergence of twin peaks in the underlying income distribution function: clustering of the 
                                                 
3
 The Economic Times News Service. Available at: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-02-
01/news/28424869_1_mckinsey-households-income.  
4
 The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act enacted by legislation on August 2005, 
aims at enhancing the livelihood security of people in rural areas by guaranteeing 100 days of wage-
employment in a financial year to a rural household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual 
work. 
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rich people, and clustering of the poor people with pockets of economic growth pulling-
up the national average income. On the other hand, a uniform growth process at a pan-
India level would lead to a disappearance of such clusters. Considering district-level per-
capita income data from the Planning Commission, Government of India, in 1999/2000 
and 2004/05, we find that the income distribution has not changed, thus the perception 
about economic reforms having benefitted only the rich is not supported by the data. 
Results suggest that between 1999/2000 and 2004/05 there is no statistically significant 
difference in the median adjusted income distribution functions. In fact, the income 
density function for 2004/05 has become more platykurtic (with fewer extreme values) 
than it was during 1999/2000, suggesting that there has been a reduction in inter-district 
per-capita income disparity.  
This idea is in the spirit of work done by Quah (1993, 1996), and Jones (1997), 
which introduces the notion of twin peaks in the cross-country distribution of incomes. 
Quah (1993, 1996) finds evidence about persistence, and stratification of income density 
functions. Jones (1997) observes that clustering can be a temporary phenomenon, as 
might happen with high frequency growth miracles data. Emergence of twin peaks 
implies polarization of the cross-country income distribution into rich and poor 
convergence clubs. 
Our study makes two important contributions.  
First, we capture interaction among neighboring districts. Economies of 
neighboring districts are interdependent. This can happen through economic agents such 
as firms located in different districts trading among themselves; or through peer-group 
effects where externalities in local labor market due to production, matching, and other 
market interaction involve movement of labors from one district to another; and even 
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through network externalities of infrastructure. We capture interaction among 
neighboring districts using Moran’s Index (I). A higher spatial correlation (I) for a 
particular variable, say per-capita income, would indicate that all the districts in India are 
more or less similar in terms of economic well-being (read, per-capita income). On the 
other hand, a lower, or a negative spatial correlation would indicate some districts have 
higher per-capita income relative to others leading to stratification in the income density 
function. We find that the Moran I for both per-capita income, and growth of per-capita 
income, are significantly positive indicating that the growth process has been uniform 
across India. There is no evidence supporting an emergence of twin peaks in the 
underlying income distribution function. This is in line with our earlier result indicating 
that income growth has been spatially correlated. Growth in one district has helped 
growth in others, and there has been no increase in income inequality among districts. 
Second, while analyzing interaction between growth and development indicators, 
we separate out, and quantify, the direct and the indirect neighborhood effect. A direct 
neighborhood effect reflects how the level of development (captured through 
development indicators) in any particular district i affects the income variable of that 
district. Whereas, the indirect neighborhood effects capture how the level of development 
in any neighboring district (say, j) affects the income level of district i. We find that 
opportunities to earn income (measured in terms of district-level per-capita income) in 
the neighboring districts positively affect income in district i. As there is free movement 
of labor and capital across districts in India, it may be responsible for a uniform income 
distribution in the country, resulting in more balance regional growth. In general, better 
development indicators, such as physical and social infrastructure, including, electricity, 
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hospitals, closed drainage system, drinking water, and banks, positively affect income in 
any particular region.  
To our knowledge this study is the first scientific attempt that makes use of 
district-level data from India, and quantifies the neighborhood effect using spatial 
econometric techniques. 
 
2. Earlier studies 
 
There are a number of studies that indicate India is spatially heterogeneous in 
terms of opportunities to earn income. Singh et al. (2010) gives a detailed account of this 
literature. Broadly speaking this literature can be divided into two groups.  
The first group comprises studies that merely stop at classifying districts and/or 
states on the basis of some development indicators without quantifying the linkages 
between the growth and the development indicators. For instance, on the basis of the 
1991 Census (Government of India, 1991), Kurian (2000) finds evidence about widening 
regional disparities in India when measured in terms of sex ratio (females per 1000 
males), female literacy, infant mortality, and level of infrastructure development. He 
finds the forward group of states (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Maharashtra, Punjab and Tamil Nadu), with higher per-capita income, have move ahead 
in terms of performance of the aforementioned parameters relative to the backward group 
of states (Assam, Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal), that is, the states 
with lower per-capita income. On the basis of data obtained from Planning Commission 
(Government of India, 2000), Mehta (2003) finds spatial inequalities exist at all level of 
disaggregation – a given state may perform extremely well on all indicators but there may 
be districts within that state that are among the most deprived in the country, or a state 
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may have very high levels of attainment on certain specific development indicator(s) but 
not on all of them.  
The second group of studies examines whether income growth across states in 
India has converged, or diverged over time. These papers find mixed evidence. After 
controlling for the difference in initial economic conditions (such as initial level of per-
capita income, share of agriculture and manufacturing sector in the state-level income), 
Cashin and Sahay (1996), Aiyar (2001), and Purfield (2006) find evidence in favor of 
convergence, whereas, Rao et al. (1999), and Bajpai and Sachs (1996) find evidence in 
favor of divergence.
5
 These studies typically use a growth accounting equation, such as 
the one suggested by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and attempt to explain long-run 
growth rates of any state conditional upon its initial output, and development indicators. 
The conflicting results about convergence or divergence may results from failure to 
capture patterns of growth at a sub-regional level, smaller than the states. This is because 
growth accounting literature typically assumes that states are similar in terms of long-run 
steady state level of income. This assumption is based on the fact that states in India have 
access to similar level of technology. However, as Aiyar (2001), and Purfield (2006), 
point out long run steady state level of income can differ because of factors such as 
spatial variation in demography, development, and state-level policies.  
More specifically, as to whether economic reforms in India has widened the gap 
between the richer, and the poorer states, here also we find mixed evidence. While 
examining the growth performance of 14 major states during the pre-reform period (from 
1980/81 to 1990/91) with the post-reform period (from 1991/92 to 1998/99), Ahluwalia 
                                                 
5
The time periods, and the number of states, considered to analyze the convergence, or divergence of state-
level per-capita income, vary. Cashin and Sahay (1996) look at a sample size of 20 states between 1961 and 
1991;  Aiyar (2001) consider 19 states between 1971 and 1996; Purfield (2006) considers 15 states between 
1973 and 2002; Rao et al. (1999) considers 14 states between 1965 and 1994; and Bajpai and Sachs (1996) 
consider 19 states between 1961 and 1993.  
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(2002), finds that not all the rich states has become richer relative to the poorer states. 
Except for the three poorer states (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa), all other states have 
narrowed the distance between themselves, and two of the richest states (Punjab and 
Haryana) during the nineties. Middle-income states such as Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil 
Nadu and West Bengal, actually grew faster during the post-reform period relative to 
their growth rates during the pre-reform periods. Ahluwalia (2002) finds private sector 
investment, physical infrastructure (such as irrigation facilities, electrification, roads, 
ports and rail transportation), and literacy rates, as factors responsible for variation in 
state-level income. 
However, Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004) find evidence in favor of increase in 
regional inequality, with the state domestic product (SDP) widening more drastically 
during the post-reform period. Arguing that the comparison in Ahluwalia (2002) is based 
on two different sets of SDP data, 
6
 Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004) extend the new 
SDP data series backward to compare growth and regional variation across states with a 
common database. They find the coefficient of variation in the per-capita SDP growth 
rate has increased from 0.19 during the eighties to 0.29 during the nineties, and the 
correlation coefficients between the average growth rates of SDP between the eighties 
and the nineties is 0.50. This means that the states with higher SDP growth rates in the 
eighties continued to experience higher growth rates in the nineties. This paper finds 
higher population growth rates is responsible for slower SDP growth rate in poorer states 
such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.  
                                                 
6
 The new 1993/94 base year SDP data series used for doing post-reform period analysis is different than 
the old 1980/81 base year SDP data series used for analyzing performance of states during pre-reform 
period. There has been a change in product classification in the new SDP data series, with more sectors 
included from the financial services, the real estate and the agricultural allied services, than there are in the 
old SDP data series (See, Bhattacharya and Sakthivel, 2004). 
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Our study fits well to this strand of literature, and address the limitation of the 
earlier studies. First, we use district-level data to capture spatial variation in income and 
development indicators that are observed at a sub-state level. Second, we use this district-
level per-capita income data to examine the dynamics of the income distribution function. 
This we do to analyze whether during the post-reform period (that is, between 1999/2000 
and 2004/05) there has been any statistically significant change in the district-level 
income density function. Finally, to capture the potential for observational interaction 
across region, such as through technological spillovers, or through good governance, we 
model the neighborhood effect. This is because, a regression based approach (cross 
section, time series, or panel) typically do not capture the neighborhood effect, and 
failure to capture neighborhood effect can result in major model misspecification 
(Anselin, 1988).
7
   
3. Empirical model  
The empirical analysis has three parts.  
In the first part of the analysis we see how per-capita district level income 
distribution (absolute, and median (relative) adjusted) has changed between 1999/2000 
and 2004/05; and between 2001/02 and 2004/05. To examine the dynamics, we draw 
density of district per-capita income for the fiscal years, 1999/2000, and 2004/05. To 
check for the robustness we repeat this exercise for the time period between 2001/02 and 
2004/05. We ran Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to ascertain whether there is any 
                                                 
7
 Even the attempt to control for regional variation using binary dummy variables, as is often done in 
regression, might not yield satisfactory results in terms of capturing intricate geographical relationship. For 
instance, Gautam Budh Nagar (one of the more progressive district in the State of Uttar Pradesh) can be 
treated as one of the richest districts in the country despite being part of Uttar Pradesh, which is classified 
as a poor state. Using district dummy for this region will fail to capture how elements of prosperity 
gradually spread from the core (say, Noida, the district headquarter of Gautam Budh Nagar) to the rest of 
Uttar Pradesh. 
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statistically significant difference in the median adjusted per-capita income distribution 
between different fiscal years: from 1999/2000 to 2004/05, and from 2001/02 to 2004/05.  
For a given cumulative density function F(X) the KS statistic is given as: 
)()(sup '' ,2,1, xFxFD nn
x
nn
 , where 
x
sup is the supremum of the set of distances 
given by ',nnD . Under condition when ',nnD converges to zero it implies no significant 
change in F(X) between the time periods 1, and 2. Under this condition, there is no 
change in moment conditions for the cumulative density functions plotted at two different 
time periods. On the other hand, a statistically significant difference in median adjusted 
per-capita income distribution at two different time periods are indication towards the 
fact that among the districts there has been an increase in income disparity. To visually 
inspect formation of twin peaks (if any), we compute the density estimates using the 
Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwith chosen for optimizing normal densities.
8
  
To complement the analysis we did in the first part, in the second part we test for 
the nature of spatial relation. Many of these spatial (cross sectional) relationships are 
captured by Tobler's first law of geography: “Everything is related to everything else, but 
near things are more related than distant things.” We test for Tobler’s principle of spatial 
interaction using Moran’s Index (I). The Moran's I introduced in 1950 is the first measure 
of spatial autocorrelation in order to study stochastic phenomena, which are distributed in 
space in two or more dimensions. We capture interaction among the neighboring districts 
by weighting the income variable with a contiguity matrix, W. We define W, such that Wij 
= 1, if district i is adjacent to district j, and zero otherwise (for the districts that are not 
adjacent). In that case, the diagonal elements will be zero (Wii = 0). Using geographical 
                                                 
8
 Compared to other kernels (Gaussian, Uniform, Triangular, and Bi-weight), Epanechnikov kernel 
minimizes the asymptotic mean integrated square error, and hence is chosen for this analysis. 
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information system we create this W matrix for all the districts in our sample. Emergence, 
or clustering of growth and development centers would yield a low, or even negative 
spatial-correlations among regions, but if all regions are on average similar then there 
will be positive spatial correlations among the regions.  
We imagine India as a network, with each district as a node in the network. 
Moran's correlation of a variable y is defined on a spatial network (W) with n - nodes 
(districts) as: 
 
  
 
, 1
:
( ' )*
n
ij i j
i j
w y y y y
I y W
trace W W y

 


 
where  y  is the standard deviation of y. Like a correlation coefficient the 
values of Moran's I range from +1 indicating a strong positive spatial autocorrelation, to 
0 indicating a random pattern, to -1 indicating a strong negative spatial autocorrelation. 
For statistical hypothesis testing, Moran's I values can be transformed to Z-scores in 
which values greater than 1.96, or smaller than -1.96, means that the spatial 
autocorrelation is significant at a 5 per cent level of significance. 
The third part of our analysis is a follow-up from the first two parts. We ask the 
question: What are the factors that might have led to an increase in per-capita district 
income in India, with or without any change, in the underlying income distribution 
function? In particular, we consider the following spatial income level model:  
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where 1Y and 2Y are the 1n vector of cross sectional observations on the log of 
district level per-capita income for the fiscal 2001/02 and 2004/05, respectively. 
0X  is a 
matrix of development indicators data that are mostly obtained from the Census 2001 
(Government of India, 2001).
9
 W is the contiguity matrix. The coefficients β measure the 
direct effect. The coefficients γ captures the indirect neighborhood effects. A negative γ 
implies spillover effects from the neighboring district j have detrimental effect on the 
income of district i. A positive γ implies otherwise. For instance, it is expected districts in 
the neighborhood of big cities will enjoy some positive externalities, and hence will tend 
to have higher income as compared to districts located further away. Gautam Budh Nagar 
(a district bordering Delhi), and Gurgaon (a district in Haryana in the neighborhood of 
Delhi) is expected to have a positive γ. It is also possible that being in the neighborhood 
of a highly developed district can suffer from negative externality due to moving away of 
productive resources to the more developed district, therefore a negative γ. 
The cross equation correlation coefficient between income in 2001/02 and 
2004/05 is given by ψ. The residual errors are spatially autocorrelated, that is, any 
positive or negative shocks in any specific district, is likely to affect the neighboring 
districts. The extent of spatial correlation is captured through 1  and 2 . As we are 
considering a system of equations, we use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) to 
generate efficient estimates. The estimation of the model is done by the method 
introduced by Kelejian and Prucha (2004). 
10
 
                                                 
9
 It is to be noted that Census of India 2001 was conducted in two phases. Information related to the 
development indicators were collected during April and September, 2000. Hence, our model does not have 
any endogeneity problem.  
10
 This methodology can be extended to panel formulation if the cross sectional observation extend beyond 
a single time period, with time dimension smaller than the cross sectional dimension. Under condition 
when the time dimension is large compared to the cross sectional dimension one has to follow methodology 
outlined in Baltagi (1995). 
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Finally, we examine whether the development indicators have any effect on 
growth of income (as oppose to level of income). For this we use the following spatial 
model.  
 IN
WXXYWY
2,0~ 
 
 
Here, Y  is the annualized growth of per-capita income between 2001/02 and 
2004/05. Like in the earlier case, the coefficient β measures the direct neighborhood 
effect, and coefficient γ captures the indirect neighborhood effect. The coefficient ρ 
captures the spillover effect of growth from the neighboring district(s). This creates a 
spatial multiplier effect. The development indicators are same as considered earlier. As 
Ordinary Least Squares method yield unbiased estimate in presence of non-spherical 
errors we use maximum likelihood method to estimate our model parameters.   
4. Data, and the results 
The data on district per-capita income is taken from Planning Commission, 
Government of India. We include districts from 29 states and 6 union territories in India. 
We consider the time period between 1999/2000 and 2004/05. Data for the years after 
2004/05 are not available for all the districts, resulting in significant drop in the number 
of observations. Also many districts are newly formed, and information about per-capita 
income for them is not available for the earlier years.
 11
 Therefore, to maintain 
uniformity, and to get a more robust result, we consider the aforementioned time period.
 
For the fiscal 1999/2000 an important omission in the Planning Commission data is 
                                                 
11
In 2000 there are 585 districts, and in 2011 there are 627 districts in India. Many of these districts are 
newly formed, and for some of them information about the income variable is not available. The case in 
point is Delhi. The Census 2001 contains information about many variables related to north, north-east, 
north-west, south, south-west, west, east, and central Delhi. However during 2001, when it comes to per-
capita income we find information only relating to Delhi as a whole, and not its constituent districts. 
Source: Planning Commission, Government of India<http://districts.nic.in/dstats.aspx>. Accessed 
(02/04/2011). 
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district-level income for the State of Gujarat, and Delhi. During 1999/2000, we have 508 
data points (out of 585 districts) in India. For the latter fiscal years (2001/02, and 
2004/05), we have data points covering 536 districts. This increase in number of 
observation is due to the inclusion of per-capita district income data from Gujarat and 
Delhi, which are not available for 1999/2000. The per-capita district income data for 
Gujarat and Delhi are taken from Indicus Analytics, Delhi.
12
 Data relating to the 
development indicators are mostly taken from the 2001 Census (Government of India, 
2001). These development indicators are: number of factories per 1 lakh population, 
percentage of households using electricity as a source of light, percentage of households 
with closed drainage system in their neighborhood, school enrolment as a percentage of 
total population, number of hospitals and dispensaries per 1 lakh population, percentage 
of households availing banking service, and percentage of households with tap drinking 
water within the household premise. The data on number of murder by use of fire arms 
for the year 1999 in each district are collected from National Crime Record Bureau, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. We have calculated the gini coefficient 
data from the Lorenz ratio obtained from Chaudhuri and Gupta (2009).
13
 To merge the 
data suitably across indicators missing observations for certain districts are dropped from 
the final data set. In total we have 485 observations. For 51 districts we do not have 
complete information for all the development indicators, and we drop them from the final 
data set. The results are generated using MATLAB.   
Results    
                                                 
12
 Indicus Analytics collect data from the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation, Government of India. CSO collate data from respective state governments. 
Planning Commission database also uses the CSO database. Therefore introducing per-capita district-level 
income data for Gujarat and Delhi for 2001/02 and 2004/05 is not going to affect (bias) our results.   
13
 Chaudhuri and Gupta (2009) use Consumer Expenditure Data obtained from 61
st
 Round of National 
Sample Survey (2004/05) conducted by Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, 
Government of India.  
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We find some interesting results. We do not find evidence in support of twin 
peaks: clustering of the rich income districts, and clustering of low income districts, 
across India. There has been uniform increase in income among all the districts.   
Table 1: Per-capita income summary statistics (in 1999 Rupees) 
 1999/00  2001/02  2004/05  
 
 Mean 15512.3 16882.7 19600.8 
 Median 14029.5 15154.5 17084.5 
 Standard 
Deviation 7660.9 9126.5 12093.4 
 Skewness 1.5 2.0 3.0 
 Kurtosis 7.3 12.1 23.3 
 
We notice from Table 1 that there is an increase in the mean, and in the median 
per-capita district income. We also notice that there is an increase in standard deviation, 
skewness, and kurtosis measures of income. In fact, as kurtosis has become very high 
during the latter period, that is, during 2004/05, the assumption of normality might not be 
valid. So we use the non-parametric sign test to test for the increase in income across 
different time periods. The results in Table 2 show that there is a significant increase in 
the mean and median per-capita district-level income between 1999/2000, and 2004/05, 
as well as between 2001/02 and 2004/05. Since the income distribution is skewed as well 
has a high kurtosis (evident from Table 1), we perform the same set of tests for the log 
per-capita income. Here also, we get similar results, indicating that there is an overall 
increase in the level of income. 
Table 2: Tests for significance in mean and variance of Income   
 1999/00 and  
2004/05 
(without Gujarat and Delhi) 
2001/02 and 
2004/05 
 
T-test of  Mean Difference: Income 19.41 (0.00)
a 
23.22 (0.00) 
16.08 (0.00) 
22.11 (0.00) T-test of  Mean Difference: Log  Income 
WP2011-11 
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Z-Value of  sign test of median: Income 6.87  (0.00) 
6.78 (0.00) 
4.98 (0.00) 
4.99 (0.00) Z-Value of  sign test of median: Log Income 
a 
P-values are in the parenthesis 
 
Since there has been an increase in the mean and the median per-capita income, 
does it indicate that districts with high per-capita income have become well-off relative to 
the districts with low per-capita income? In other words, do we find any evidence in 
favor of cluster, or divergence of income between the richer and the poorer districts? To 
analyze this we plot income density function for 1999/2000, 2001/2002 and 2004/05, in 
Figure 1.  
We observe that considering districts income data there is definitely no evidence 
about emergence of twin peaks in any of these periods. There is a shift in the per-capita 
income density function during these time periods. This is due to a significant increase in 
the mean, and the median per-capita income, from 1999/2000 to 2004/05.  
 
Figure 1: Median adjusted densities and distribution of district-level log-income in 
1999/2000, 2001/02, and 2004/05. 
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The income distribution functions also show evidence about first-order stochastic 
dominance: Income distribution function for 2004/05 lies everywhere below (that is, to 
the right of) income distribution drawn for 2001/02.
14
 Similarly, income distribution for 
2001/02 lies to the right of income distribution drawn for 1999/2000. This implies that 
between 1999/2000 and 2004/05, poverty has fallen. This result is not surprising. It is 
widely documented that when economic growth happens absolute poverty falls.
 15
 What 
is more interesting is to examine whether among districts there is any significant change 
in the median adjusted per-capita income distribution function between 1999/2000 and 
2004/05, and between 2001/02 and 2004/05? This is relevant, especially, because we 
                                                 
14
 An income distribution function stochastically dominates another if the percentage of people below any 
given income change amount is smaller in the first than in the second. The income distribution function that 
stochastically dominates the other also has less poverty than the other.   
15
 For an excellent discussion on this topic see, Fields (2001) pp.102-104. 
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observe income density function for 2004/05 has become more platykurtic (with fewer 
extreme values) than it was during 1999/2000. We ran KS test to ascertain this.   
Table 3: Tests of Distributional Difference of median adjusted Log Income  
 1999/00 and 2004/05 
(without Gujarat and Delhi) 
2001/02 and 2004/05 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) one 
sided test statistics 
0.042 (0.38)
a 
0.036 (0.48) 
a 
P-values are in the parenthesis 
Results suggest that between 1999/2000 and 2004/05 there is no statistically 
significant difference in the median adjusted income distribution functions. We arrive at a 
similar conclusion while comparing the income distribution functions for 2001/2002, and 
2004/2005. In fact, a glance at the median adjusted per-capita income densities drawn for 
1999/2000, 2000/01, and 2004/05, suggest that these distribution functions are more or 
less similar (Figure 1). The data suggests that both the rich, and the poor districts, has 
equally become well-off. There has been a reduction in income disparity among districts.  
To visually compare the effects, we divide India into high, medium and low 
income regions using the 33
rd
 and 66
th
 percentiles of the income data from 2001/02 (Rs 
13484.8, and Rs 20897.2, respectively). Figure 2b shows these different income regions 
for 2001/02. Using the same values we obtain the high, medium, and low income regions 
for the year 2004/05 in Figure 2a. The striking observation is that some of the districts 
from Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Rajasthan have moved from the low income category 
to the middle income category.  
Figure 2a: District per-capita income for 2004/05 subdivided into high, middle, and low, income 
categories, according to 33
rd
 and 66
th
 percentiles (using 2001/02 as base income). 
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Figure 2b: District per-capita income for 2001/02 subdivided into high, middle, and low, income 
categories, according to 33
rd
 and 66
th
 percentiles (using 2001/02 as base income). 
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It is quite evident from the above two maps that for 2004/05, there are more 
number of districts in the middle and the high income categories, than there were during 
2001/02. These mini-district-economies interacted with each other, and manage to grow 
together. We argue that as inter-income disparity has fallen among districts between 
2001/02 and 2004/2005, going forward there is a likelihood of this income disparity even 
falling further. This is because active labor and capital market intervention have started 
only post 2005; when in addition to MGNREGA, government introduced other schemes 
such as mid-day meal schemes for primary school going children, Indira Awas Yojana 
(building houses for the poor), Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (scheme for building 
rural roads), and other microfinance activities. Hence, if there has been a fall in inter-
district per-capita income disparity for the period before these schemes were started, 
there is a likelihood that the process of income generation to be more uniform once these 
schemes are in place.  
As there is indication about the per-capita district-level income growing together, 
we use Moran I to test for the degree, and the nature of spatial relation between them.  
Table 4: All India Moran Indices for income and growth 
Variable 
Moran 
Index (I) t-statistics 
'Per-capita Income 1999/2000' 0.54 19.74 
'Per-capita Income 2001/02' 0.53 20.33 
'Per-capita Income 2004/05' 0.48 18.51 
'Per-capita Annualized Income Growth 1999/00-2004/05' 0.38 13.88 
'Per-capita Annualized Income Growth 2000/01-2004/05' 0.26 10.05 
 
Table 4 indicates Moran I for both the growth, and the income variables are 
significantly positive. Highly significant t-statistics implies that the regression errors are 
spatially auto-correlated. For instance, Moran I for 1999/2000 is 0.54 implying during 
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that particular year 54 per cent of the income in district i is influenced by incomes in the 
neighbouring districts. Considering districts as the unit of account, we find that the 
growth process has been uniform across India. Moran I is positive when economic 
characteristics of nearby objects (districts) are similar. We do not find any evidence about 
emergence of growth centers, that is, clustering of the high income districts, and 
clustering of the low income districts. In general, there is positive reinforcement of the 
growth process.  
In the next section we examine the common externalities of income processes, if 
any, across geographical boundaries. Put differently, we want to find out the channel 
through which growth is translating to development, and vice versa. To select the 
appropriate variables we take note of various growth models,
 16
 and existing literature on 
India’s income, and development dynamics.  
For instance, we consider gini coefficient on the basis of the study by Tendulkar 
(2010). He admits that there has been a rise in summary measures of relative inequality 
(gini coefficients) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12). Similarly, following 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982), and Rosenzweig (1990), we choose number of hospitals, 
water and sanitation infrastructure, and school enrollment, respectively, as these variables 
have significant effect on growth and development indicators of a region. Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin (1982) find child mortality in India falls in presence of more clinics per-
capita, and in presence of better water and sanitation infrastructure (such as closed 
drainage system). Rosenzweig (1990) finds that higher male wages have a positive 
income effect on schooling, and raise school enrollment. As a proxy for access to finance, 
we choose bank branch, and as a proxy for governance and institution, we choose 
                                                 
16
 Solow growth model, endogenous growth models, or models dealing with micro-foundation of 
macroeconomics like rational expectation type models. 
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numbers of murder. Burgess and Pandey (2004) finds that the rural bank branch 
expansion program in India has a significant effect in terms of reducing rural poverty, 
and to increase non-agricultural output. Kochar et al. (2006), finds that states with weaker 
institutions and poorer infrastructure have experienced lower GDP, and lower industrial 
growth. Finally, as Aiyar (2001), Ahluwalia (2002), and Purfield (2002) find investment 
in productive capacity (especially, private sector investment) as an important factor 
explaining variation in state-level income, we include number of factories per one lakh 
population as an explanatory variable as a proxy for productive capacity.     
Therefore, the independent variables
17
 that we consider for our study are gini 
coefficient (proxy for income inequality); school enrollment (proxy for human capital); 
banks, electricity, closed drainage system, drinking water, and hospitals (proxy for social 
and physical infrastructure); factories (proxy for investment in productive capacity and 
opportunities to earn income), and murder (proxy for governance). Our dependent 
variable is log of per-capita income for 2001/02, and 2004/05. All these data are at a 
district level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 One limitation of the data is failure to capture the quality issue for the services that are provided. For 
example, there are issues relating to teacher absenteeism, quality of drinking water, healthcare services, etc. 
Modeling this quality aspect requires experiment such as randomized controlled trial – something outside 
the scope of this paper. 
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Table 5: SUR Estimates of Income Distribution. 
 
                                                                                     Equation 1                                                    Equation 2 
                                                                               Dependent Variable                                   Dependent Variable                                                             
                                                                                Log income 2004/05                                  Log income 2001/02                     
System R-square    
 
0.553 
 
Cross-equation correlations ( ) 0.919 
R-bar Square 0.679 0.685 
No. observations, No. Variables 485,    19 485,    19 
Independent Variables (2001 Census) Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 8.3647
** 
86.48 8.2919
**
 93.94 
No. of factories total 0.0004
* 
2.38 0.0004
*
 2.44 
Gini coefficientª  0.6409
* 
2.31 0.6116
*
 2.42 
Murder
b
  0.0003
 
0.76 0.0003 0.98 
Electricity connection 0.003
* 
2.28 0.0031
*
 2.54 
Closed drainage  0.0057
** 
2.95 0.0044
*
 2.52 
School enrolment  0.009
** 
3.72 0.0085
**
 3.83 
Hospitals and dispensaries  0.0034
** 
3.65 0.0031
**
 3.67 
Banking services  0.0064
** 
2.92 0.0062
**
 3.12 
Tap drinking water  0.0029
** 
2.81 0.0023
*
 2.41 
! 
W*No. of factories total
 
0.0002
** 
4.37 0.0002
**
 3.18 
W*Gini coefficient  0.108 1.20 0.1064 1.30 
W*Murder  0 -0.23 0 0.29 
WP2011-11 
 
 23 
W*Electricity connection 0.0004 1.16 0.0008
**
 2.63 
W*HH closed drainage  0.0003 0.40 -0.0002 -0.27 
W*School enrolment  -0.0002 -0.40 -0.0002 -0.38 
W*Hospitals and dispensaries  -0.0003 -0.80 -0.0003 -0.83 
W*Banking services  -0.002
** 
-3.53 -0.0019
**
 -3.56 
W*Tap drinking water  -0.0003
 
-1.32 -0.0004 -1.78 
ρ 1 , ρ2 0.096
* 10.48 0.094* 10.10 
*
Indicates the coefficient is significant at a 2.5 per cent level, and 
**
 indicates the coefficient is significant at a 1 per cent 
level. ª On the basis of 61
st
 Round of National Sample Survey conducted in 2004/05. 
b
 Figures for 1999. 
! 
W is the weighting matrix. 
 
Our findings suggest that with the exception of total murder (proxy governance); 
direct effects of the development variables are statistically significant, and are of 
expected signs. The significant gini coefficient indicates that for any district income 
inequality is good for income generation. However, as the KS test in the earlier section 
indicates, income inequality within any given district is not contributing to divergence in 
median income across districts. As both the coefficients on factories, and school 
enrollment, are statistically significant it might indicate that availability of skilled labor 
force increases income. Similarly, better development indicators, such as physical and 
social infrastructure, including, electricity, hospitals, closed drainage system, drinking 
water, and banks, help business to grow in any particular region. This in turn creates 
opportunities to earn more income. The coefficient on murder rate is statistically not 
significant. This may be because of poor conviction rate in India.
18
 While analyzing the 
effect of indirect neighborhood effect we find the coefficients on factories and electricity 
are significantly positive, whereas, the coefficient on bank is significantly negative. There 
is a positive influence on income of district i if there is income generating potential in the 
                                                 
18
 Between 2005 and 2009 the average conviction rate for murder is only 36.2 per cent. Out of nearly 1.27 
hundred thousands murder only 44601 people were convicted. See, Times of India News Service. Available 
at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Conviction-rates-for-murder-
abysmal/articleshow/8720229.cms.  
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neighboring districts (captured as W*No of factories total). Similarly, better electricity, 
by facilitating growth of business in the neighboring districts may contribute to income 
generation in district i. A negative neighborhood coefficient in the banking variable 
implies banks in the neighboring districts can lure away productive investment from 
district i, and hence adversely affect its income. The coefficient ρ 1 and ρ2 are 
significantly positive with values, 0.096 and 0.094, respectively. It means that the 
spillover effect of income generation from one district to another adjacent district is 
around 10 per cent. The cross-equation income correlation is around 0.91, that is, income 
in both the time periods (2001/02 and 2004/05) are highly correlated. High cross-
equation income correlation also implies that the districts with higher per-capita income 
will continue to perform better relative to the districts with lower per-capita income. 
However, as is evident from the KS test results in the earlier section, a higher cross-
equation income correlation does not automatically imply an increase in income disparity 
between the richer and the poorer districts, something suggested by Bhattacharya and 
Sakthivel (2004) in their paper while doing state-level analysis. 
 We next examine whether the development indicators affect growth of income. 
We notice, in general development indicators does not affect income growth. The initial 
level of income (2001/02) is not statistically significant. However, the spillover effect of 
income growth (  ) is significantly positive, implying that around 5 per cent of the 
income growth in one district is affected by income growth in the neighboring districts. A 
significantly positive neighborhood factor which affects income growth is the number of 
factories in the adjacent districts. The policy implication is that to facilitate convergence 
of income among districts there is a necessity to create more employment opportunities. 
Rapid industrialization is the only way to improve growth convergence. This result is 
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similar to that of Ahluwalia (2002), where he finds private sector investment in 
productive capacities, and in social (such as human capital) and physical infrastructure 
(such as ports, airports, national highways, telecommunication, etc.), are positively 
related to the variation in state-level income. 
 
Table 6: Spatial autoregressive Model Estimates of the Growth Model 
 
Spatial autoregressive Model Estimates  
                                                                                    Dependent Variable 
                                                                                         Income Growth 2001/02-2004/05 
R-squared           0.179 
Rbar-squared        0.143 
sigma^2             0.015 
No. observations, No. variables         485,    21 
Log-likelihood      499.37 
Independent Variables (2001 Census) Coefficient t-stat 
Constant -0.00699 -0.03 
Log income 2001/02 -0.01793 -0.79 
No. of factories total 0.001846 0.10 
Gini coefficient ª 0.007674 0.27 
Murder
b
  -0.01078 -1.15 
Electricity connection 0.00411 0.45 
Closed drainage  0.023684 2.15 
School enrolment  0.055874 1.16 
Hospitals and dispensaries  0.046039 1.44 
Banking services  -0.02304 -0.79 
Tap drinking water  0.001156 0.11 
! 
W*Log income 2001/02 0.003265 0.60 
W*No of factories total 0.015465
*
 2.80 
W*Gini Coefficient  -0.00407 -0.48 
W*Murder  -0.00075 -0.27 
W*Electricity connection -0.00747 -2.17 
W*Closed drainage  -0.00265 -0.81 
W*School enrolment  -0.01621 -1.30 
W*Hospitals and dispensaries  -0.01256 -1.34 
W*Banking services  0.002735 0.36 
W*Tap drinking water  0.002991 1.10 
  0.051977* 4.42 
*
 Indicates the coefficient is significant at a 2.5 per cent level, and 
**
 indicates the coefficient is significant at a 1 per cent 
level. ª On the basis of 61
st
 Round of National Sample Survey conducted in 2004/05.
b
 Figures for 1999. 
! 
W is the weighting matrix. 
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4. Conclusion 
This paper finds that during the post-reform period, India has not only managed to 
grow fast but has also performed well in terms of providing quality life (measured in 
terms of per-capita income) to its citizen. Working with district-level data for the period 
between 1999/2000 and 2004/05, results suggest no divergence in income across districts 
in India. The income dynamics provide no evidence in support of the twin peaks 
hypothesis: clustering of the rich income districts, and clustering of the poor income 
districts at a pan-India level. Income growth has been spatially correlated – growth in one 
district aids growth in others, and there has been a reduction in income disparity among 
districts. For the time period between 1999 and 2005, districts in the State of Rajasthan, 
Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa have done particularly well, whereas we find evidence for 
pockets of deprivation in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Most of the variables 
explaining growth and development of a region, such as human capital, physical, and 
social infrastructure, are all contributing to the Indian growth story. As active labor and 
capital market interventions have started only post 2005, we argue that going forward, 
this inter-district income disparity is likely to fall further in comparison to what we have 
observed between 1999/2000 and 2004/2005. 
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